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Abstract
In  this  paper  I  argue  that  understanding  is  an  indispensable  epistemic  procedure  when
historians use texts as evidence. On my account understanding installs a norm that determines
what kind of event or object a texts is evidence of. Historians can debate which norms should
govern a body of texts, and if they reach consensus, they can use that body of texts as an
empirical  constraint  over  their  historical  claims.  I  argue  that  texts  cannot  perform  this
constraining function without understanding – it is thus indispensable. In order to argue for
this position I first discuss two existing accounts of textual evidence in analytic philosophy of
science by Kosso and Hurst. Both defend a coherentist position. I show that their coherentist
position is flawed by applying it to the famous case of Lucien Febvre's argument that François
Rabelais  was  not  an  atheist.  I  show  that  a  coherence  between  texts  leaves  the  debate
concerning  Rabelais'  religious  beliefs  underdetermined,  even  though  this  should  not  be
necessary. I argue that my account of understanding better captures Febvre's actual reasoning
with texts. In the final section of the paper I show that the two most famous accounts of
understanding  in  analytic  philosophy  by  Hempel  and  Taylor  ignore  either  the  epistemic
indispensability  of  understanding,  or  the  actual  success  of  evidentiary  reasoning  in  the
historical sciences that was enabled by understanding.
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1. Introduction
Certain questions about the past can only be answered by using various types of texts as
evidence. Ascertaining whether a 16th century novelist was an atheist or not, can only rely on
his writings and the contemporary testimonies about the author or his works. Similarly, the
question whether certain Amazonian tribes actually performed cannibalistic rituals in the 16th
century  can  only  be  answered  through  textual  reports  of  these  rituals.1 Or,  in  order  to
determine whether Captain Cooke was really considered to be the Hawaiian God Lono during
his final days in Hawaii, one can only use the textual reports of the events and of Cooke's
previous relation to Hawaiian society.2 In all these cases historians are faced with a body of
texts that should be used as evidence to guide their account to the truth about past events,
beliefs and societies. Many historians consider such questions worth pursuing, and think that
they are solvable in principle based on the available textual evidence. 
Often,  however,  historians  disagree  what  exactly  texts  are  evidence  of.  Such  discussions
among historians are interesting material for a philosophical investigation into the nature of
textual evidence. In principle, textual materials from the vast archives of human endeavours
should yield a similar body of evidence as observation and experimentation in the natural
sciences. Unfortunately, philosophy of science lacks an extensive literature on the specific
problems  concerning  textual  evidence  in  historiography.  This  is  a  missed  opportunity.  A
reflection  on  the  specific  nature  of  textual  evidence  might  help  philosophers  to  better
understand the  nature  of  evidence  in  general.  Moreover,  such a  reflection  could  also  aid
historians in better grasping the possible avenues to reason through textual evidence.
In this paper I first summarize the only two existing accounts of textual evidence in analytic
philosophy, namely by Kosso and Hurst. I, then, introduce a case study that will guide my
analysis  throughout the rest  of the paper,  namely  Lucien Febvre's  argument  that  François
1 Among historians  there  has  been a considerable  debate  over the testimony of  cannibalism amongst the
Tupinambá that  was given by 16th century German sailor Hans Staden. Some have argued that Staden's
account  should  be  read  as  a  trustworthy  testimony  of  cannibalist  rituals  (Forsyth  and  Staden  1985;
Whitehead 2000), while others have emphasized the commercial motives of Staden's sensational account
and its related untrustworthiness (Schmolz-Haberlein and Haberlein 2001). 
2 The case of the apotheosis of Captain Cooke is important, as it also determines the image of Cooke and his
relation as a British imperialist towards Hawaiians. The case is especially interesting because historians can
only rely on British reports of the events, and should thus try to refrain from understanding those events
solely from the viewpoint of the reporting persons (Obeyesekere 1997).
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Rabelais was not an atheist. Based on my analysis of this case I point out that the analyses of
Kosso and Hurst fail to account for the actual use of textual evidence by historians, because
their  accounts do not assign any epistemic function to the understanding of texts. I argue
instead  that  an understanding of  texts  is  epistemically  indispensable  in  the assessment  of
textual evidence. In the final section of the paper I demonstrate that the two most famous
accounts of understanding in analytic philosophy ignore either the epistemic indispensability
of understanding (Hempel 1942), or ignore the actual success of evidentiary reasoning in the
historical sciences that is made possible by understanding (Taylor 1971).
2. A Coherentist Position on Evidence in History
Peter Kosso introduced an account of how textual evidence in historiography can itself be
justified. His main question is how textual evidence from the past can be deemed reliable and
accurate (Kosso 1993, 1).  “Any claim that can justify must also be justified.” (Kosso 1993, 6)
He  argues  that  textual  evidence  can  be  justified  through  four  different  avenues  of
corroboration  (Kosso  1993,  7).  The  first  and according to  him most  reliable  avenue is  a
corroboration by independent material sources. For instance, the report of a solar eclipse can
be checked through astronomical knowledge. The second avenue is corroboration from other
independently  written  sources  that  state  similar  things  as  the  text  that  is  in  need  of
justification. A third path assesses the reliability of the author of the text, his method and
intentions  when  writing  the  text.  The  fourth,  and  most  difficult  path  is  purely  internal
criticism of a text. In this case a historian looks for inconsistencies or improbabilities within
the  text  itself,  and  tries  to  isolate  the  doubtful  passages.  Kosso  concludes  that  the
accountability of evidence is mainly an internalist procedure: one mostly checks the reliability
of  textual  evidence  against  other  texts  and  there  can  be  no  checking  against  the  events
themselves (Kosso 1993, 12). This situation requires that the historian aims to attain maximal
coherence between texts, and tries to attain a constant supply of new evidence to cohere with.
"Continued coherence in a process of accumulating claims (more observations, more data,
more texts read) adds credibility by surviving the increasing chances of failure." (Kosso 1993,
13) 
A related coherentist account of historical evidence is given by Hurst (Hurst 1981). Hurst
argues that all data descriptions of the historian should always fit within a narrative about the
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past.  Data  descpritions  are  “narrative-laden” (Hurst  1981,  278–279).  Specifically,  Hurst
argues that every description of a datum entails a hypothesis. It supposes that the change it
describes actually occurred. This, in turn, forces the historian to fit all his data descriptions
and their related hypotheses into a coherent and consistent narrative (Hurst 1981, 281). For
instance whether a text should be described as a message or as an aide memoire depends on
the historian's narrative concerning the writer of the message, which in turn is related to other
narratives about the period in general (Hurst 1981, 282). The historian starts from all kinds of
physical objects, among others texts, and then builds up a consistent and coherent network of
change-referring datum descriptions of that body of texts (Hurst 1981, 283). When faced with
incoherence, the historian can change the datum description of an object, or change other data
descriptions within the narrative. Similar to Kosso,  Hurst believes that historians should be
constantly on the lookout for more objects from the past and their related data-descriptions
that fit the larger narrative or web of hypotheses which they defend. “It is a methodological
requirement to seek out data whose discovery is predictable only on the basis of the one rather
than  the  other  narrative  network.”  (Hurst  1981,  289)  This  way,  the  historian  seeks
progressive, maximal coherence and consistency between various webs of hypotheses about
the past, all related to physical objects through data-descriptions. Hurst's inspiration for this
forward-looking  paradigm  of  historical  research  is  Lakatos'  ideas  about  progressive  and
degenerate research programs (Hurst 1981, 287). 
Both  Kosso  and  Hurst  emphasize  that  textual  evidence  can  only  perform its  epistemic
function within a larger coherent web of other pieces of historical data.  Thus, the evidence of
any historical  claim should always be linked to  a larger  network of evidence.  In Kosso's
account,  the  search  for  coherence  is  cashed  out  in  four  categories  of  corroboration  of
evidence,  in different degrees of internalism. Hurst's account is less specific about the exact
ways  data  descriptions  as  hypotheses  should  cohere  within  a  network.  Both  accounts,
however, strongly emphasize that historical evidence always operates within a larger network
of evidence. All pieces of available evidence on the one hand need to cohere with each other,
and on the other hand with possible future pieces of evidence.
3. The Problem of 16th Century Unbelief
In  order  to  discuss  the  problems  with  a  coherentist  position  about  textual  evidence,  I
introduce a case study which is taken from a highly influential  historical work by Lucien
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Febvre.3 Febvre's book The problem of 16th century unbelief: the religion of Rabelais is both
an ambitious overview of the evidence for unbelief in France during the first half of the 16th
century and a methodological  reflection on the nature of evidence for unbelief.  The book
consists of two parts. The first part is directed against a thesis advanced by Abel Lefranc in
the preface to his 1923 edition of the completed works of François Rabelais. Lefranc was a
French historian of literature contemporary to Febvre who had claimed that Rabelais was one
of the first in a long French, rationalist and atheist tradition. Febvre devotes the first part of
the book to discrediting any possible piece of textual evidence supporting Lefranc's view. To
this end, Febvre needed to disprove much of the evidence that Lefranc thought had accrued
for  the  claim  that  Rabelais  was  an  atheist.  Febvre's  assessment  of  the  textual  evidence
concerning Rabelais'  religious beliefs  is still  accepted by historians  (Gauna 1992, 25–26).
Because  this  part  of  Febvre's  book explicitly  brings  the nature of  textual  evidence  under
scrutiny, I will go over it in more detail and use it throughout this paper as an exemplary
account of the epistemic role of textual evidence in historiography. 
The second part  of  Febvre's  book contains  a  much stronger  and still  very controversial
claim: Rabelais could not have been an atheist, because he lacked any theoretical language or
metaphysical worldview to express such a belief. This claim, however interesting, brings with
it central metaphysical questions about what it means to have a belief. Since it is not directly
related to evidentiary problems and pushes itself deep into the realm of philosophy, I will not
say anything else about  it.  My concern is  solely with the function of textual  evidence  in
historiography.
The evidence for Rabelais' unbelief, as it was set out by Lefranc, can be split up into two
fields:  the  testimonies  of  Rabelais'  contemporaries  on his  religious  beliefs,  which  Febvre
treats in the first book of part one and the ideas that Rabelais expressed in his literary works,
which are treated by Febvre in the second book of part one. In both fields Lefranc thought he
had found evidence for Rabelais'  unbelief.  Febvre scrutinizes  every piece of text  in great
detail  and  tries  to  discredit  this  evidence.  I  will  use  two examples  to  show how Febvre
proceeds. The first example is the accusation of Rabelais as an atheist by Calvin in 1550. This
textual testimony seems like a very clear and convincing piece of evidence: Calvin as one of
3 More than 40 years after its original publication, Febvre's book was translated into English and it was hailed
as a book that could still pose some of the most penetrating questions concerning 16 th century texts and our
understanding of them (Kelley 1984; Wootton 1988). It is also one of the classics of the highly influential
Annales school (Iggers 1997, 55–56).
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the most important theologians at that time surely knew what he was talking about and would
not make such an accusation lightly. Febvre emphasizes the huge importance this text seems
to have: "It is the text." (Febvre 1962, 125) Febvre, however, argues that we cannot take this
to be evidence for Rabelais' unbelief, because such an accusation does not imply that Calvin
had studied Rabelais' texts and concluded that he was an atheist, a denier of any deity. Febvre
shows that  an accusation  of  atheism was thrown around by almost  everyone and against
everyone  between  1533  and  1550  in  French  literary  and  theological  circles.  If  such  an
accusation should be taken as evidence of unbelief, we should believe that everyone was an
unbeliever (Febvre 1962, 134). Before the accusation can be used as evidence of unbelief, it is
important,  according  to  Febvre,  to  understand  it  within  the  culture  of  reasoning  that  is
particular to that era (Febvre 1962, 134). This understanding entails that the "mental tools"
[outillage mentale] of that age should be taken into account: an accusation of atheism was
more like an insult to someone that could be launched without much proof or rigour (Febvre
1962, 142).  More than a precise statement of the true beliefs about a person, it was a sign of
great  differences  in  religious  opinions  between  the  historical  actors.  Thus,  on  Febvre's
argument the textual accusation of Rabelais by Calvin is only evidence of resentment towards
Rabelais from the side of Calvin. 
Going over to the second field of evidence of Rabelais' unbelief, Febvre is confronted with a
similar situation. In chapter XXX of his Pantagruel, Rabelais writes a resurrection scene that
seems to mock the miraculous  resurrection of Jaïre  and Lazarus  from the new testament.
Mocking the miracles of Christ could be taken as clear evidence of an expression of unbelief.
Here, Febvre's strategy again focuses on situating the text within its contemporary style of
thinking or "mental tools" [outillage mentale]. In order to understand the text properly, Febvre
claims that one needs to realize that the resurrection scene is foremost a reference to other
similar resurrection scenes in a then popular genre of the  chansons de gestes. Of course, it
would still be a parody of a resurrection and remain suspicious (Febvre 1962, 203). Febvre,
however, argues that the popular belief in miracles, which was widely spread in society, was
exactly itself part of a controversy within Christianity: both Erasmus and Luther wanted to
separate the faith in Christ from the popular belief  in miracles. Again, whatever Rabelais'
exact intentions were, it is very difficult to take the text in chapter XXX of  Pantagruel as
evidence  of  unbelief,  given  the  fact  that  very  strong  believers  themselves  had  great
reservations against the popular belief in miracles.   
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One of the central messages of Febvre's book concerns precisely the caution to directly treat
texts as evidence for a historical claim. The historian should not take a text of an author as an
isolated piece of evidence, and "just because a certain passage in his work fits in with the
direction of one of our own modes of feeling, to decide that he fits under one of the rubrics we
use today for classifying those who do or do not think like us in matters of religion." (Febvre
1962, 15; Febvre 1985, 5) Febvre warns his readers that texts in isolation do not yield any
evidence  for  any  historical  claim.  At  most,  a  text  that  is  considered  in  isolation  by  the
historian will become an artefact of the categories of our thinking, but in no case can it be
evidence for the thoughts of the historical actors themselves.4 This can also occur if many
texts are treated in isolation, but taken together seem to comprise a large body of evidence, as
it was with Lefranc's case for Rabelais' unbelief. 
Nevertheless,  Febvre  explicitly  believes  texts  can  be  used  as  evidence:  they  perform a
constraint  on the possible claims that a historian can make. This constraining function of
textual evidence will, however, require the right kind of understanding or reading of the text.
Even if the texts would be richer, the testimonies more talkative, and the confessions more
detailed, the correct understanding of the texts would still be a necessary requirement (Febvre
1962, 15).5 The notion of "understanding" or "reading" of texts and other historical sources is
completely absent from the accounts of Hurst and Kosso. As any good empiricist position,
they exclude notions, such as understanding, that cannot be reduced to empirical evidence
itself.  If  their  accounts  are  compared with Febvre's  argumentative  strategy,  this  results  in
problems.
4. The Epistemic Indispensability of Understanding
The  coherentist  position  of  Kosso  and  Hurst  entails  that  texts  on  themselves  have  no
epistemic meaning. Their framework thus resembles a central norm of Febvre's evidentiary
4 A very similar  warning can  be found in Skinner's  Meaning and Understanding in  the history of  ideas
(Skinner 1969, 6). Skinner's problem is very similar to Febvre's: as an intellectual historian he reflects how
the historian should assess textual sources of—in his case—early modern political theory. 
5 In Skinner's article this point is given much attention: “the underlying assumption of this whole approach—
that one should focus simply on the texts themselves, and study what each classic writer has to say about
each  given doctrine—must  necessarily  remain a wholly inadequate  methodology for  the conduct  of  the
history of ideas.” (Skinner 1969, 31)
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reasoning: one is never to leave a piece of textual evidence on its own (e.g. the accusation of
atheism by  Calvin).  "We have  to  restrain  ourselves  from using  documents  in  isolation".
(Febvre 1962, 32) Instead, Febvre relates any documents that could be used as evidence to
other documents. In the case of the accusation by Calvin, Febvre brings along other texts to
assess the significance of the accusation. He specifically points to similar textual accusations
by Dolet,  Henri  Estienne,  and notably  Rabelais  himself.  (Febvre 1962,  129–134) Febvre,
however, uses these to argue over the significance of these texts, and thus over what they are
evidence of. He does not use them as justification for the reliability or unreliability of Calvin's
accusation, as Kosso's framework would have it. Neither does he show, as Hurst's framework
implies,  how  the  description  of  Calvin's  text  as  an  accusation  is  (in)consistent  with  the
descriptions of other similar texts. Whether the descriptions of these texts are inconsistent
cannot be determined by the texts themselves. An external norm needs to assess this. And I
argue that understanding is such a norm. 
 Both Kosso and Hurst argued that their coherentist models of textual evidence are forward-
looking: it is important that the consistent network can be expanded by actively looking out
for new pieces of evidence. However, as I pointed out in the previous section, Febvre claims
that uncovering more texts, and even more intimate testimonies would not prove to be more
enlightening. The discovery of new texts in which Rabelais is accused of atheism cannot help
in ascertaining what such texts are evidence of: of unbelief, as Lefranc would want it, or of
religious controversy, as Febvre argues. 
Fundamentally, the coherentist proposals suffer from the following problem. They transfer
the constraining nature of textual evidence to the coherence with other texts. Texts, however,
can  never  justify  their  own reading.  In  Febvre's  case,  the  evidentiary  significance  of  the
accusation  by  Calvin  cannot  be  justified  by  accusations  of  other  religious  controversists,
because it is equally unclear what those other accusations are evidence of. Even if there were
an  accusation  of  atheism  aimed  at  Rabelais  by  e.g.  Luther,  the  significance  of  such  an
accusation could still be interpreted in several ways, even though Calvin also made such an
accusation. In this sense the coherentist position is too weak: the mere coherence between
texts,  even  the  possible  future  coherence  leaves  historical  reasoning  through  texts
underdetermined, even though cases like Febvre's reasoning show that this can be avoided.
The coherentist account thus breaks apart when the historian requires evidence about the texts
themselves, specifically when the historian needs evidence of what texts are evidence of. And
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he cannot find this is in other pieces of textual evidence. 
Febvre's evidentiary reasoning emphasizes that the significance of texts within the historical
age needs to be assessed, before these texts can be used as evidence for or against a certain
historical claim. Assessing the significance of a body of texts determines what those texts are
evidence of, and this assessment is exactly what can be called the understanding of texts. Let
us revisit the rival understandings of Calvin's accusation of atheism.  Lefranc's thesis – that
Rabelais was an atheist – is based on an understanding of what it means to be accused of
atheism in the 16th century.  To be accused of  atheism by a strong believer,  according to
Lefranc, is at least partly what it is to be considered a true atheist in the 16 th century. Such an
understanding installs a norm and constitutes the empirical evidence of unbelief, namely all
the documented accusations of atheism in the 16th century. Febvre's rival understanding of
what it means to be accused of atheism in 16th century France does not yield this evidence. He
defines an accusation, especially in the first half of the 16th century, as being part of what it
means to disagree with someone on religious matters. So Febvre's understanding yields the
textual accusations as evidence of religious controversy between different actors. 
How can one know which of the rival understandings of textual documents better constitutes
religious reality of 16th century France? Not through some kind of direct empirical research
(accruing  more  texts  e.g.),  since  the  understanding  determines  what  the  documents  are
empirical evidence of. Febvre answers this question by claiming that his understanding of
texts is more in line with the mental tools of the era than Lefranc's. Febvre's understanding
constitutes Calvin's text, the struggle of Erasmus and Luther against irrational beliefs, and
Rabelais' writings within a shared religious controversy of the era. Lefranc's understanding of
these texts breaks them apart, and sets out different rules of thinking for all of their authors.
Thus,  a  non-empiricist  coherentist  position  emerges:  not  the  coherence  between the  texts
themselves should be the prime goal, but coherence between the norms that constitute what
historical  object  or  event  a  text  is  evidence  of.  This  search for  and discussion  about  the
appropriate norms that govern a body of texts can be labelled as the search and discussion
over  the  understanding  of  texts.  Understanding  is  thus  an  epistemic  and  indispensable
procedure  that  determines  what  physical  texts  are  evidence  of.  It  is  epistemic,  because it
constitutes how texts can be evidence for historical claims. It is also indispensable, because
without  the  constitution  of  texts  as  evidence  historians  are  faced  with  nothing  but  bare
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physical documents that have no bearing on historical claims about the past.6 
5. Understanding as Epistemic Category
Understanding  has  been  a  controversial  epistemic  category  in  analytic  philosophy  of
science. The most influential and also controversial account of understanding was given by
Carl  Hempel  in  an  article  on  the  use  of  general  laws  in  historiography  (Hempel  1942).7
Hempel  is  very  clear  on  the  nature  of  understanding  or  empathic  understanding as  he
describes it. "It is essentially a heuristic device; its function is to suggest certain psychological
hypotheses which might serve as explanatory principles in the case under consideration."8
(Hempel 1942, 44) The operation of understanding on Hempel's account will yield candidates
for explanatory claims of the historical events through the imagination of the historian. The
soundness of the intuitively generated claims can, however, only follow from an empirical
confirmation (Hempel  1942, 45).  In Hempel's  reconstruction of the justificatory  nature of
historical explanations he separates the understanding of texts or sources on the one hand
from the  empirical  verification  or  justification  on  the  other  hand.  Although  the  heuristic
procedure  of  understanding  can  generate  various  accounts,  only  empirical  evidence  can
arbitrate which of those accounts is correct or empirically more adequate.
Hempel's  heuristic  notion  of  understanding  fails  to  capture  the  indispensability  of
understanding  within  the  evidentiary  reasoning  of  historians. His  framework  entails  a
predicament in typical cases like Febvre's argument against Lefranc: by introducing a better
understanding of 16th century texts, the evidentiary nature of the texts changes, which leads
6 Hurst also emphasizes that historical data, without a proper description and its related hypothesis about some
change in the past, is meaningless for the historian (Hurst 1981, 279). The understanding of texts, however,
is not a direct hypothesis about some occurrence in the past which can be related to other empirical data, as
Hurst's data-descriptions are.  Understanding determines how an entire  body of texts is  related to  some
delineated period of the past. Thus, understanding as an epistemic procedure determines a much wider range
than the single data-description of Hurst's model.
7 Hempel’s paper is  now considered by many to have led philosophy of history on a wrong track.  “This
approach was a deeply impoverished one, and handicapped from the start in its ability to pose genuinely
important questions about the nature of history and historical knowledge.” (Little 2012, sec. 3.1) Also see
(Roth 1999, 249)
8 Hempel restates this central claim also in later papers, see e.g. (Hempel 1965, 161, 257). Hempel's position
on understanding is typical for the opposition to understanding in logical empiricism  (Uebel 2010).
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Febvre to argue for different claims based on the same texts. Hempel's framework has no
account of the understanding of a text that yields new evidence: evidence is exactly what must
arbitrate  between  rival  hypotheses  that  came  out  of  rival  understandings.  Hempel's
characterization  of  the  relation  between  evidence  and  understanding  thus  turns  into  a
contradiction:  the very  element  that  is  subjective  and in  need of  empirical  justification  –
namely understanding – brings about the specific evidence that is supposed to test it. Any
exclusion of understanding from the use of textual evidence in historiography will have to
face  this  issue.  And  a  mere  heuristic  account  simply  fails  to  adequately  deal  with  this
problem. 
That Hempel's model of verification for historiography is flawed because of the importance
of understanding texts in the human sciences is not a new insight. The best-known argument
for this weakness came from Charles Taylor's papers on interpretation in the human sciences
(Taylor 1971; Taylor 1980). Taylor argued that the verificationist model of science could not
be reconciled with a hermeneutic science. Because the latter moves in a circle from reading to
reading and is only interested in making sense of a specific societal practice, it will never
attain a verificationist procedure to fall back on (Taylor 1971, 46). The understanding that is
achieved  through  a  hermeneutic  science  cannot  elaborate  hypotheses  that  enable  one  to
predict and verify (Taylor 1971, 48). Prediction and the possibility of empirically verifying a
prediction  rest  on  the  possibility  of  relating  a  past  and  a  future  event  under  the  same
conceptual net. This, however, is exactly what a hermeneutic understanding does not allow:
there is no justification for presupposing that various events can be understood through the
same conceptual scheme. Conceptual innovation brings an alteration of human reality along
with it (Taylor 1971, 49). Taylor's conclusions are quite radical: "We cannot measure such
sciences against the requirement of a science of verification: we cannot judge them by their
predictive capacity. We have to accept that they are founded on intuitions which all do not
share,  and what is  worse that these intuitions are closely bound up with our fundamental
options."9 (Taylor 1971, 51) If human understanding is indispensable in any science of human
action, then one must sacrifice the norm of universal agreement free from interpretive dispute
and the requirement of intersubjective consensus (Taylor 1980, 38). 
Taylor's conclusion is to go die-hard hermeneutic and reject any possibility of evidentiary
standards for the hermeneutic sciences: they are bound up with our self-understanding and
9 For a similar argument and conclusion one could also look at (Berlin 1960, 12–16). 
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thus part of a never ending process of understanding one's position in the world. While Taylor
adequately  points  out  that  understanding  is  an  indispensable  aspect  of  research  in  the
humanities,  he fails  to clarify how understanding is intimately entwined with the rules of
evidence  that  are  specific  to  research  in  those  sciences.  He  is  very  quick  to  deny  any
possibility of intersubjective consensus for the humanities due to their necessary use of the
procedure of understanding. Through the case of Febvre's reasoning with 16 th century texts,
however,  I  have  shown  that  the  indispensability  of  understanding  should  not  entail  the
impossibility of actual evidentiary standards that lead to intersubjective consensus. Historians
do really  use texts  as actual  evidence  that  can justify a historical  claim,  even of a  rather
complex nature, such as “Rabelais was not an atheist”.
The hermeneutic  stance gives  no specific  role  to  texts  as evidence.  According to  many
philosophers  of  historiography,  however,  textual  evidence  plays  an  important  epistemic
function as that which constrains the possible narratives or theories that a historian can yield
of  an  age,  event,  or  person.  In  many  defences  of  historiography  against  post-modern
relativism the notion of historical evidence has been used as the only possible touchstone of
the accounts of historians. Paul Roth has argued that empirical evidence needs to have some
kind  of  function  in  the  assessment  of  theories  under  consideration  (Roth  2007,  272).
Similarly,  Avizier  Tucker  claimed  that  scientific  historiography  relies  on  some  central
cognitive values of the research community of historians, one of the most important among
them  being  "respect  for  evidence  that  consists  of  cross-referenced  documents  and  oral
testimonies" (Tucker 2001, 53). 
I  have  argued that  understanding  plays  an  indispensable,  epistemic  role  as  a  norm that
constitutes what a text is evidence of. Rival understandings produce rival bodies of evidence,
and these rival understandings can only be assessed as they produce a maximally coherent set
of rules of thinking in a historical era. The search for coherence between the rules of thinking
that constitute the significance of a text, is, however, close to Taylor's hermeneutic stance.
Contrary to Taylor, I have, however, emphasized that texts can be used as actual evidence in
an intersubjectively accessible process of historical reasoning. Texts and their understanding
are  not  entwined  in  an  unbreakable  circle:  it  is  understanding  that  constitutes  texts  as
evidence. If agreement is reached over the understanding of a specific set of texts, historians
are warranted to use these as constraints over their historical claims.
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This  positive  reassessment  of  understanding  within  evidentiary  reasoning can  help  the
practice of historiography by making explicit where historians stop arguing through textual
evidence and start arguing over what texts are evidence of. Such a distinction was already
made explicit by Febvre in his book. The end of his first chapter was about the mental tools of
the historical actors that we need to use to decide what a text can be evidence of  (Febvre
1962, 139–142). Febvre in this chapter is making explicit how he changes what early 16 th
century French accusations of atheism are evidence of. Ever since Febvre's book, historians
have accepted that the texts that used to be regarded as evidence of Rabelais'  unbelief no
longer are such evidence (Gauna 1992, 26). Febvre's explicit argumentative procedure has in
this way definitively advanced one aspect of 16th century historiography. Making a shift in the
understanding explicit can in this way yield insight into the reasons why certain seemingly
evidentiary  conflicts  within  the  discipline  of  historiography  cannot  be  solved  by  merely
adding more evidence.
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